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1 Introduction
The litterature dealing with multi-rationales decision making has known
new interesting developments in the last few years. We can divide these
developments into three main categories.
The first series of papers considers that two binary relations should be
composed by constructing a composite binary relation as follows.1 For any
two alternatives, x and y, x is strictly prefered to y if it is so according to
the first rationale or if y is not strictly prefered to x according to the first
rationale and x is strictly prefered to y according to the second rationale.
Then, the choice is made by maximizing the composite binary relation. This
procedure of decision making has the advantage to show nice properties of
rationality. On the contrary, it is often empty and in these cases it does not
help make a decision.
The second series of papers deals with the problem of multi-rationale
decision making as follows.2 In order to choose in a set, first, a decision is
made by maximizing the first binary relation. Second, the choice is made
by maximizing the second binary relation in the set of elements that have
been preselected in the first step. Contrary to the first procedure, this one
always makes non-empty choices under mild assumptions. However, it fails
at satisfying the usual rationality properties.3
The third procedure that has been imagined in order to compose two
rationales works has follows. In a given set, a prudent composition of the
rationales is constructed. It is a binary relation that contains the first ra-
tionale and as many elements of the second rationale as possible such that
the prudent composition remains acyclic. Obviously, a prudent composi-
tion is not necessarily unique. Then, an element is chosen if there exists a
prudent composition such that the considered element is maximal according
1See [Tadenuma, 2002], [Tadenuma, 2005].
2See [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007a], [Manzini and Mariotti, 2007b].
3See [Houy, 2007] and [Houy and Tadenuma, 2007].
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to this prudent composition. This procedure has been introduced and ax-
iomatized by [Houy, 2008]. This procedure always makes non-empty choices
under mildest assumptions than the ones required for the second procedure.
However, as the second procedure, it fails at satisfying the usual rationality
properties.
This paper is an attempt to add a new procedure in the line of what
has been done in the latter stream of litterature. We propose to construct
the set of prudent compositions as it has been defined above. However, we
will consider that an element is chosen if for any prudent composition, the
considered element is maximal according to this prudent composition. Hence,
what we define is a refinement of the prudent choice procedure. The purpose
of this article is to give an axiomatization of this refinement and show some
of its properties.
In Section 2, we intraoduce the notation. In Section 3, we give the axioms
and our characterization result.
2 Notation
Let X be a finite set of alternatives. Let X = 2X \ ∅ be the set of
all non-empty subsets of X. A choice correspondence on X is a function
C : X → X such that ∀S ∈ X , C(S) ⊆ S.4 Let C(X) be the set of all choice
correspondences on X.
Let C ∈ C(X). For any subset S ∈ X , we define the two-tier domina-
tion relation (TD(S,C)) as follows. Let R, T ∈ X be such that R, T ⊆ S.
(R, T ) ∈ TD(S,C) if and only if R ∪ T = S, R ∩ T = ∅ and ∀r ∈ R,∀t ∈
T,∃S ′ ∈ X , a ∈ C(S ′) and b ∈ S ′. Hence, R two-tier dominates T in S for C
if and only if {R,T} is a partitioning of S such that there exists no element
in T that menu-indenpendently dominates any element of R.
Let P ⊆ X×X be a binary relation on X. For any subset S of X, P |S is
4Notice that by definition, ∀S ∈ X , C(S) 6= ∅.
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the restriction of P to S, i.e. P |S= {(a, b) ∈ P, a, b ∈ S}. P
t is the transitive
closure of P i.e. ∀a, b ∈ X, (a, b) ∈ P t if and only if ∃n ∈ N, ∃a1, ..., an ∈ X
such that ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P , a1 = a and an = b. We say
that P is irreflexive if and only if ∀a ∈ X, (a, a) /∈ P . We say that P is
asymmetric if and only if ∀a, b ∈ X, (a, b) ∈ P implies (b, a) /∈ P . We say
that P is acyclic if and only if ∀a ∈ X, (a, a) /∈ P t.5 An asymmetric binary
relation will be called a preference relation.
Let P1 and P2 be two preference relations on X. We define Q(P1, P2) by
∀a, b ∈ X, (a, b) ∈ Q(P1, P2) if and only if (a, b) ∈ P1 or [(b, a) /∈ P1 and
(a, b) ∈ P2].
Let (P1, P2) be an ordered pair of preference relations on X such that P1
is acyclic. Let S ∈ X . We say that P ⊆ X ×X is a prudent composition of
P1 and P2 on S if
• P = P1 |S
⋃
Q with Q ⊆ P2 |S,
• P is acyclic and,
• ∀Q′ such that Q ⊂ Q′ ⊆ P2 |S, P1 |S
⋃
Q′ is cyclic on S.
Then, a prudent composition of P1 and P2 on S is a binary relation con-
taining P1 and as many elements of P2 as possible with the constraint that
the prudent composition is not cyclic. We denote by ̂(P1, P2)(S) the set
of all prudent compositions of P1 and P2 on S. Notice that by definition,
̂(P1, P2)(S) is non-empty if and only if it is well defined or, said differently,
if P1 |S is acyclic.
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Let P ⊆ X ×X be a preference relations on X. We define CP : X → 2
X
by
∀S ∈ X , CP (S) = {a ∈ S,∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P}.
5Notice that, by definition, acyclicity implies asymmetry and asymmetry implies ir-
reflexivity.
6Obviously, if ̂(P1, P2)(S) = {∅}, we still have ̂(P1, P2)(S) 6= ∅.
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If CP is choice correspondence, i.e. ∀S ∈ X , CP (S) 6= ∅, we say that P
rationalizes the choice correspondence CP . Let P1, P2 ⊆ X × X be two
preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. We define C
∪
(P1,P2)
by
∀S ∈ X , a ∈ C∪(P1,P2)(S) ⇔ a ∈ S and ∃P ∈
̂(P1, P2)(S) such that
∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P.
If C∪(P1,P2) is a choice correspondence, we say that (P1, P2) ∪-prudently ratio-
nalizes C. We define C∩(P1,P2) by
∀S ∈ X , a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S) ⇔ a ∈ S and ∀P ∈
̂(P1, P2)(S),
∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P.
If C∩(P1,P2) is a choice correspondence, we say that (P1, P2) ∩-prudently ratio-
nalizes C.
3 Characterization
The first three lemmas characterize the choices made by CQ(P1,P2), C
∪
(P1,P2)
and C∩(P1,P2). The first lemma is straightforward and left to the reader as a
simple exercise. The second lemma has been proved in [Houy, 2008].
Lemma 1
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X. Let S ∈ X and a ∈ S. a ∈
CQ(P1,P2)(S) if and only if:
• ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
• ∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ P1.
Lemma 2
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. Let S ∈ X and
a ∈ S. a ∈ C∪(P1,P2)(S) if and only if:
• ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
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• ∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ (Q(P1, P2) |S)
t.
Lemma 3
Let P1, P2 be two preference relations on X with P1 acyclic. Let S ∈ X and
a ∈ S. a ∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S) if and only if:
• ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
• ∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ (P1 |S)
t.
Proof. If: Let S ∈ X and let a ∈ S. Assume that ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and,
∀b ∈ S such that (b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) ∈ (P1 |S)
t. Assume that a /∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S).
Then, by definition, ∃P ∈ ̂(P1, P2)(S) such that ∃b ∈ P, (b, a) ∈ P . By
definition, P1 |S⊆ P ⊆ P1 |S ∪P2 |S. Then, either (b, a) ∈ P1 or (b, a) ∈
P2. The first case can not occur by assumption. In the second case, by
assumption, (a, b) ∈ (P1 |S)
t and then P is cyclic which is impossible by
definition. Hence a contradiction.
Only if: Let S ∈ X and let a ∈ S. 1) Assume that ∃b ∈ S, (b, a) ∈
P1. Obviously, by definition, ∀P ∈ ̂(P1, P2)(S), P1 |S⊆ P . Then, ∀P ∈
̂(P1, P2)(S),∃b ∈ S, (b, a) ∈ P . Hence, by definition, a /∈ C
∩
(P1,P2)
(S). 2)
Assume that ∃b ∈ S, (b, a) ∈ P2 and (a, b) /∈ (P1 |S)
t. Then, P1 ∪ {(a, b)} is
acyclic on S. Hence, there exists P ∈ ̂(P1, P2)(S) such that P1∪{(a, b)} ⊆ P .
Hence, by definition, a /∈ C∩(P1,P2)(S). 
As a simple corollary, we can show that C∩(P1,P2) is a refinement of C
∪
(P1,P2)
and CQ(P1,P2) is a refinement of C
∩
(P1,P2)
. As we have stated in the introduc-
tion, C∪(P1,P2) never makes empty choices under very mild assumptions. On
the contrary, CQ(P1,P2) often makes empty choices. Hence, the introduction
of C∩(P1,P2) can be seen as an attempt to refine C
∪
(P1,P2)
without showing all
the weaknesses of CQ(P1,P2).
Corollary 1
Let P1, P2 be two binary relations on X such that P1 is acyclic. For all
S ∈ X , CQ(P1,P2)(S) ⊆ C
∩
(P1,P2)
(S) ⊆ C∪(P1,P2)(S).
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The remainder of this article is a characterization of C∩(P1,P2) by its prop-
erties. The following axioms are needed.
The first axiom is an usual one in choice theory and is given in [Sen, 1993]
for instance. It states that if an alternative is chosen from different sets, then,
it is chosen from the union of these sets.
Axiom 1 (γ)
Let C ∈ C(X). The choice correspondence C satisfies γ if and only if ∀n ∈ N
and ∀S1, ..., Sn ∈ X ,
a ∈
⋂
i∈{1,...,n} C(Si) implies a ∈ C(
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} Si).
The second axiom is a weak version of the usual Chernoff or α consistency
condition. Let us interpret it. Assume that the set S can be divided into two
distinctive subsets, T and R such that R two-tier dominates T , i.e. there is
no element of T that menu-independently dominates any element of R. Now,
consider that there is an element a in T that is not chosen when considered
with an element b in R. Then, a is dominated by b, not only because a is not
chosen from the set {a, b}, but also because a is an element of T , two-tier
dominated by R, of which b is an element. Then, Axiom Weak α states that
in this case of double domination, a should not be chosen from S.
Axiom 2 (Weak α)
Let C ∈ C(X). The choice correspondence C satisfies Weak α if and only if
∀S ∈ X and ∀a ∈ S,
if ∃(R, T ) ∈ TD(S,C) such that a ∈ T and ∃b ∈ R, a /∈ C({a, b}), then
a /∈ C(S).
Notice that Axiom Weak α is weaker than the usual Axiom α. In fact, it
is also weaker than the Axiom α2 which is itself a weak version of Axiom α,
see [Sen, 1977].7 Indeed, if Axiom α2 is assumed, a /∈ C(S) is a consequence
7In our framework, the usual Axiom α can be written as follows: the choice correspon-
dence C satisfies α if and only if ∀S, T ∈ X such that T ⊆ S and ∀a ∈ T , if a /∈ C(T ),
then a /∈ C(S). Axiom α2 can be written as follows: the choice correspondence C satisfies
α2 if and only if ∀S ∈ X and ∀a ∈ S, if ∃b ∈ S, a /∈ C({a, b}), then a /∈ C(S).
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of ∃b ∈ S, a /∈ C({a, b}) only and the two-tier domination requirement is not
necessary.
Let us show by means of an example that Axiom Weak α is strictly
stronger than Axioms α and α2. Let us have X = {a, b, c} and C ∈ C(X)
be such that C({a, b}) = {a}, C({a, c}) = {c}, C({b, c}) = {b} and C(X) =
{c}. Obviously, C does not satisfy α2 since C({b, c}) = {b} should imply c /∈
C(X). Since Axiom α is stronger than Axiom α2, it is obviously not satisfied
by C. However, C satisfies Weak α since even though C({b, c}) = {b}, we
have TD(X,C) = {({c}, {a, b}), ({c, a}, {b})} and then Weak α is satisfied.
Notice also that Axiom Weak α is stronger than the axiom of consistency
stated in [Houy, 2008] (we will call this axiom WWα). Indeed, the latter
states that ∀S ∈ X and ∀a ∈ S if [there exists a partitioning {R, T} of S
such that ∀d ∈ R, ∀e ∈ T , d ∈ C({e, d}) and such that a ∈ T and ∃b ∈
R, a /∈ C({a, b})], then a /∈ C(S). Let us show with the following example
that Weak α is strictly stronger than WWα. Let us have X = {a, b, c} and
C ∈ C(X) be such that C({a, b}) = {a}, C({a, c}) = {c}, C({b, c}) = {b}
and C(X) = X. Obviously, WWα is satisfied. On the contrary, Weak α is
not. Indeed, ({c}, {a, b}) ∈ TD(X,C) and a /∈ C({a, c}). Then, if Weak α
was satisfied, we would have a /∈ C(X).
Proposition 1 shows that a choice correspondence can be ∩-prudently
rationalized if and only if it satisfies γ and Weak α.
Proposition 1
Let C in C(X). The choice correspondence C satisfies γ and Weak α if and
only if there exist two preference relations P1, P2 with P1 acyclic such that
(P1, P2) ∩-prudently rationalizes C.
Proof. If: Let C ∈ C(X) be ∩-prudently rationalized by the ordered pair
of binary relations (P1, P2) with P1 acyclic.
Let us show that C satisfies γ. Let n ∈ N and let S1, ..., Sn ∈ X .
Assume a ∈
⋂
i∈{1,...,n} C(Si). By Lemma 3, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∀b ∈ Si,
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(b, a) /∈ P1. Then, ∀b ∈
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} Si, (b, a) /∈ P1. Moreover, by Lemma
3, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n}, ∀b ∈ Si, (b, a) ∈ P2 ⇒ (a, b) ∈ (P1 |Si)
t. Then, by defini-
tion, (a, b) ∈ (P1 |S
i∈{1,...,n} Si
)t. Then, ∀b ∈
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} Si, (b, a) ∈ P2 implies
(a, b) ∈ (P1 |S
i∈{1,...,n} Si
)t. Then, by Lemma 3, a ∈ C(
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} Si).
Let us show that C satisfies Weak α. Let S ∈ X and a ∈ S be such
that ∃(R, T ) ∈ TD(S,C) such that a ∈ T and ∃b ∈ R, a /∈ C({a, b}).
a /∈ C({a, b}) implies (b, a) ∈ P1 or ((b, a) ∈ P2, (a, b) /∈ P1 and (b, a) /∈ P1).
If (b, a) ∈ P1, then a /∈ C(S) follows by Lemma 3. Assume (b, a) ∈ P2,
(a, b) /∈ P1 and (b, a) /∈ P1. By definition, (R, T ) ∈ TD(S,C) implies ∀r ∈
R,∀t ∈ T , (t, r) /∈ P1. Hence, (a, b) /∈ (P1 |S)
t. Then, by Lemma 3, a /∈ C(S).
Only if: Let C ∈ C(X) satisfy γ and Weak α. Let us show that there exist
two preference relations P1, P2 with P1 acyclic such that (P1, P2) ∩-prudently
rationalizes C.
Let us define P1 = {(a, b) ∈ X × X,∀S ∈ X , a ∈ S ⇒ b /∈ C(S)} and
P2 = {(a, b) ∈ X ×X,C({a, b}) = {a} and ∃S ∈ X , a ∈ S, b ∈ C(S)}.
1) P1 is acyclic. Assume on the contrary that P1 is cyclic. Then ∃n ∈
N\{1}, ∃a1, ..., an, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., n−1}, (ai, ai+1) ∈ P1 and (an, a1) ∈ P1. Then,
by definition, C({a1, ..., an}) = ∅ which contradicts the fact that C is a choice
correspondence.
Let us show that (P1, P2) ∩-prudently rationalizes C. Let S ∈ X and let
a ∈ S.
2) Assume ∃b ∈ S, (b, a) ∈ P1. Then, by definition, a /∈ C(S).
3) Assume ∃b ∈ S, (b, a) ∈ P2 and (a, b) /∈ (P1 |S)
t. Let us define a(P1 |S
)t = {c ∈ S, (a, c) ∈ (P1 |S)
t} ∪ {a}. By definition, a(P1 |S)
t 6= ∅ since
a ∈ a(P1 |S)
t. Moreover, S \ a(P1 |S)
t 6= ∅ since b ∈ S \ a(P1 |S)
t. Obviously,
∀d ∈ a(P1 |S)
t, ∀e ∈ S\a(P1 |S)
t, (d, e) /∈ P1 (else e ∈ a(P1 |S)
t by definition),
i.e. ∃S ′ ∈ X , d ∈ S ′, e ∈ C(S ′). Hence, (a(P1 |S)
t, S\a(P1 |S)
t)) ∈ TD(S,C).
Then, by Weak α, a /∈ C(S).
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4) Assume ∀b ∈ S, (b, a) /∈ P1 and [(b, a) ∈ P2 implies (a, b) ∈ (P1 |S)
t].
Let us define B = {b ∈ S, (b, a) ∈ P2}. Obviously, ∀d ∈ S \ B, (d, a) /∈
P1 ∪ P2, then, by definition, a ∈ C({a, d}). Then, by γ, a ∈ C(S \ B).
Let b ∈ B. By assumption, ∃n ∈ N \ {1},∃a1, ..., an ∈ S such that ∀i ∈
{1, ..., n − 1}, (ai, an+1) ∈ P1 with a1 = a and an = b. Let us define Sb =
{a1, ..., an}. Then, by definition, ∀i ∈ {2, ..., n}, ai /∈ C(Sb). Since C is a
choice correspondence, we necessarily have {a} = C(Sb). This reasoning
holds for all elements of B and then, a ∈
⋂
b∈B C(Sb). Hence, by γ, a ∈
C(
⋃
b∈B Sb). With a ∈ C(S \B) and still by γ, we have a ∈ C(S). 
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